People often want to donate things to help others.
People in need don't always need what donors are sending them. Money is often superior to used goods.
This sounds like an opportunity for arbitrage, or at least for a civic minded middleman.
Some people will still prefer to donate goods because they feel that gives them more control over how their donation is used than money (presumably your old tennis shoes aren't as likely to end up lining a tin pot dictator's pocket than a cash donation.) I imagine that others prefer to donate goods because it's just easier, or it gives them a chance to clean out some things they would like to throw away but feel guilty about "wasting." Also, donating something you'd like to throw away doesn't incur as much of a cost to you as a cash donation does.
So, how about starting a non profit that serves other nonprofits? Your local charities, churches, aid agencies, whatever will now accept donations of goods. Those goods will be picked up by our nonprofit, sold on EBay, and the proceeds given back to the original charity to use as they will. Alternatively, you could set up a firm that accepts donations of goods, sells them on EBay (or Craig's list or through their own contacts) and then donates the proceeds to a charity/aid agency that you choose from a list of their partners.
This would probably need to be a local effort, it's probably a lot easier to convince people to drop off their old stuff than to ship it. There will be some losses due to shipping expenses and donations of essentially worthless stuff. But the net result might be positive, more total donations (since agencies that wouldn't normally take donations of goods now could at low cost) and more liquidity within the donations market.
You can market it as doing two good things with one donation: Giving money to your preferred charity and providing quality used goods at low prices to people who need them.
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Say it with me: "You cannot compare utility across individuals!"
"Irrationality" is a big subject in several fields of economics and is intruding on public discourse more and more. New York is debating banning the use of salt in restaurants because it can lead to high blood pressure or something, smoking faces ever more sin taxes and regulation, Libertarian or New Paternalism shows up more and more often. The underlying assumption: People are irrational and do not make the optimum choices. Therefore it is appropriate for the government or someone else to step in and encourage or force them to do what's best for them.
It's paternalistic, Father knows best reasoning.
It's also all based on, what I feel is, a very shakey assumption: The utility of some quality of life at some point in the future is greater than the utility you gain from this activity now.
I have serious doubts about this assumption. First, there is a great amount of uncertainty about the future, and uncertainty causes a rational actor to reduce the expected value of something. Look at smoking, I think they told me in high school that smoking a cigarette reduces my life expectancy by 15 minutes. Rationally, as a high schooler I should be indifferent between smoking and extra living, then, if the utility gained by enjoying that cigarette is equal to a marginal 15 minutes of life 60 or 70 years from now. However, I will only be able to enjoy those extra 15 minutes if I survive to the end of my natural life. I lose the time if I die in a car crash or break my neck in the shower or any number of possibilities, but I am certain to gain the utility of a cigarette if I light up now. Rationally, we should discount the value of future life due to the uncertainty of surviving long enough to enjoy it.
Secondly, this assumes that life in the future provides as much utility as life now, call it the time value of life. Remember to think at the margins, healthy living will add time to your life at the end of it. Is it that much of a stretch to believe that a rational actor will determine that their quality of life in their twilight years will be lower than it is now? Shouldn't the aches, pains, confusion, and indignities experienced at the end of life not affect our estimation of how much utility we gain from living at the end of our lives? If so, isn't it reasonable that a rational actor will discount the value of life at the margin and place a higher weight on activities now?
I don't have all the answers, or even all of the questions to address New Paternalists' assumptions now. But the glib assumption that people are irrational because they choose to smoke or eat fatty foods now instead of enjoying a few extra years when they're 80 seriously irk me. Someone else's preference ordering is different than yours, news at 6:00. There is no reason to assume that behavior that favor utility in the present over utility in the future are any more irrational than behaviors that prefer labor to leisure or pizza to beer.
One of the things that I have to think more about is that the utilty of life _now_ is very high, regardless of whether now is at the age of 15 or 50 or 97. We are always willing to give up a great deal to extend our life at this moment. But, should this future valuation affect our decisions now? I'm thinking this is because of a difference in relative values verses absolute values. Life in the now has a high relative value compared to life close to now. But the absolute value of life changes over time, the value of life during high school might be lower than when your children are in grade school, but higher than while you are in a nursing home. So, in that perspective, borrowing time from the end of your life through destructive behavior now might be the rational way to look at it.
It's paternalistic, Father knows best reasoning.
It's also all based on, what I feel is, a very shakey assumption: The utility of some quality of life at some point in the future is greater than the utility you gain from this activity now.
I have serious doubts about this assumption. First, there is a great amount of uncertainty about the future, and uncertainty causes a rational actor to reduce the expected value of something. Look at smoking, I think they told me in high school that smoking a cigarette reduces my life expectancy by 15 minutes. Rationally, as a high schooler I should be indifferent between smoking and extra living, then, if the utility gained by enjoying that cigarette is equal to a marginal 15 minutes of life 60 or 70 years from now. However, I will only be able to enjoy those extra 15 minutes if I survive to the end of my natural life. I lose the time if I die in a car crash or break my neck in the shower or any number of possibilities, but I am certain to gain the utility of a cigarette if I light up now. Rationally, we should discount the value of future life due to the uncertainty of surviving long enough to enjoy it.
Secondly, this assumes that life in the future provides as much utility as life now, call it the time value of life. Remember to think at the margins, healthy living will add time to your life at the end of it. Is it that much of a stretch to believe that a rational actor will determine that their quality of life in their twilight years will be lower than it is now? Shouldn't the aches, pains, confusion, and indignities experienced at the end of life not affect our estimation of how much utility we gain from living at the end of our lives? If so, isn't it reasonable that a rational actor will discount the value of life at the margin and place a higher weight on activities now?
I don't have all the answers, or even all of the questions to address New Paternalists' assumptions now. But the glib assumption that people are irrational because they choose to smoke or eat fatty foods now instead of enjoying a few extra years when they're 80 seriously irk me. Someone else's preference ordering is different than yours, news at 6:00. There is no reason to assume that behavior that favor utility in the present over utility in the future are any more irrational than behaviors that prefer labor to leisure or pizza to beer.
One of the things that I have to think more about is that the utilty of life _now_ is very high, regardless of whether now is at the age of 15 or 50 or 97. We are always willing to give up a great deal to extend our life at this moment. But, should this future valuation affect our decisions now? I'm thinking this is because of a difference in relative values verses absolute values. Life in the now has a high relative value compared to life close to now. But the absolute value of life changes over time, the value of life during high school might be lower than when your children are in grade school, but higher than while you are in a nursing home. So, in that perspective, borrowing time from the end of your life through destructive behavior now might be the rational way to look at it.
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